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The key insight of foundationalism-an insight to which coherentists must pay homage-is that our judgments must somehow be connected with our sub-judgmental experience of the world. The fact that foundationalists have been unable to embody this insight in a defensible theory should not lead us to abandon the insight itself.
One more preliminary comment is in order, and then we can get down to business. Some of his ideas give us a way out of our predicament.
Wittgenstein said a lot of really strange things, but two of the strangest-and most important for our purposes-are the following: fi) that I cannot know that I am in pain. I can, however, know that other people are in pain.
[ii] that initial indoctrination in a language-system is not education, but training.
What I wish to maintain, taking my cue from these theses of Wittgenstein's, is that what links bare experiences to elementary 'judgments' of perception is not judgment, but association.
I would suggest that elementary judgments of perception are judgments only in a special sense, which will be explored in what follows.
Consider the way that we learn language in the first place. Our parents hold a red thing before us and say the word 'red;' this procedure is repeated over and over, and when we finally utter the sound 'red' upon being presented with a red thing, we are rewarded with a sweet.
In this way a linguistic 'peg' is established.
We do not know that a red thing is red, but we associate the quality redness with the linguistic peg. It is a relation which obtains between two contents of consciousness when the presence of one immediately elicits the idea (here meant in Hume's sense of a faint mental 'image' of the appropriate perceptual type) of the other. Thus, the association between a sensequality, e.g. red, and a sound-word, 'red,' need not depend on any prior judgments, implicit or otherwise. When the child is presented with a red object, his consciousness glides automatically-with no thought on his part-to the idea of the sound-word 'red.' Now, at the extremely low level of a child who has just learned the word 'red,' judgment is not yet present.
Before proceeding any further, it is necessary to give a brief account of what 'association' is to mean
The child does not know that a red thing is red; all he 'knows' is that saying the sound 'red' when presented with a red thing resulted in getting a sweet (and he 'knows' this only by quasi-memory). But as the child continues to experience and learn, his world becomes richer. He acquires linguistic pegs for more experiences, and begins to learn linguistic pegs for the relations between these experiences-e.g., that this 'red'-experience is 'behind' that •green'-experience; or that a 'red'-associated experience never occurs at the same time and position in~his perceptual field as a 'green'-associated experience. And eventually, mirroring in his consciousness the structure which he finds in his experience, he realizes that a 'red'-experience is distinct from a •green'-experience-i.e., he acquires rudimentary concepts of identity and difference-depending, as before, on quasi-memory. Further, at some point it dawns on him that the 'red'-experience is sometimes present, and sometimes not-thereby acquiring rudimentary concepts of presence and absence.
It is within the context of the child's rudimentary concepts of identity and difference, presence and absence, that the essential form of judgment-that one thing is another-arises. The preceding account is, of course, rather sketchy, but 1 think it captures the essence of what goes on.
Let us now return more specifically to the question about our most elementary judgments of perception. What I wish to maintain is that in one respect they are judgments, but that in another respect they are mere associations.
As the child's awareness of the world broadens, he arranges the mental representations of the sound-words he has learned into a formal structure isomorphic to that which he finds in his experience. This formal structure is a system of thought in embryo.
With the advent of the formal mental representation of the structure of the child's experience, the soundword 'red' has come to be associated with two things. On the one hand, it is associated with the redexperience.
But on the other hand, it has now become associated with a place in a formal system of mental representations of sound-words. It is in this latter association that the elementary judgment of perception really becomes a judgment.
As the formal structure becomes more and more completely articulated-with more words for qualities, spatial and temporal relations, etc.-there will be certain arrangements of words which are possible and certain arrangements which are not: these possibilities and impossibilities mirroring those found in the child's experience. Then, when the child associates the word 'red' with a red thing, the association will fit in harmoniously with the rest of his associations. For example, consider the following:
Since in experience a red and a green cannot occupy the same position in a perceptual field at the same time, the second set of associations is in conflict, i.e., is incoherent.
We now have, no longer a mere association of an experience with a sound-word, but an elementary judgment of perception. We have a mental unit which is association HI association \\2 association 03
•this-red' 'this-same-that• •that-red' But consider another case association #1 association U2 association (13 connected to 'bare experience' but which can also be tested for truth or falsity by virtue of its position in a formal system. And the test involved is coherence! Thus, we have done what we set out to do. We have provided a link between knowledge and experience such that elementary judgments of perception are justified, albeit not quite in the way we had expected.
Unsolved problems:
To really go through, the preceding account must be supplemented by more complete theories of memory and quasi-memory, the nature of judgment, and a more explicit account of just exactly how judgment arises out of a hodge-podge of quasimemory associations. These questions will provide the most interesting 3 and challenging issues in the months and years to come.
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